Zinchenko p and involuntary memorization m 1961. Involuntary memorization and activity

22.09.2019

Zinchenko P.I. INVOLUTIONARY MEMORY AND ACTIVITY

Reader on general psychology. Psychology of memory / Under. Yu. B. Gippenreiter, V. Ya. Romanov. M., 1979. S. 207-216.

In foreign psychology, as we have already noted, involuntary memorization was understood as the random imprinting of objects that, in the words of Myers Shallow, were within the scope of attention when it was directed to some other objects. This understanding determined the methodological principle of most studies, which consisted in isolating certain objects as much as possible from the activities of the subjects by the instruction evoked, leaving these objects only in the field of perception, i.e., only as background stimuli. We assumed that the basic form is not voluntary memorization is a product of purposeful activity. Other forms of this type of memorization are the results of other forms of activity of the subject.

These provisions determined the methodology of our research. To reveal the natural connections and dependencies of involuntary memorization on activity, it is necessary not to isolate certain material from it, but, on the contrary, to include it in some activity other than mnemonic, which is voluntary memorization.

The first task of such a study was to experimentally prove the very fact of the dependence of involuntary memorization on human activity. To do this, it was necessary to organize the activities of the subjects in such a way that the same material was in one case an object to which their activity is directed or which is closely related to this direction, and in the other - an object not directly included in the activity, but located in the field perceptions of subjects acting on their senses.

For this purpose, the following research methodology was developed.

The experimental material was 15 cards with an image of an object on each of them. Twelve of these items could be classified into the following four groups: 1) primus, kettle, saucepan; 2) drum, ball, toy bear; 3) apple, pear, raspberry; 4) horse, dog, rooster. The last 3 cards had different contents: boots, gun, beetle. Classification of objects according to their specific characteristics made it possible to conduct experiments with this material not only with students and adults, but also with preschool children.

In addition to the image, each card had a number written in black ink in its upper right corner; the numbers indicated the following numbers: 1, 7, 10, 11, 16, 19, 23, 28, 34, 35, 39, 40, 42, 47, 50.

The following 2 experiments were carried out with the described material.

In the first experiment, subjects acted with objects depicted on cards. This action was organized and experienced differently with subjects of different ages. With preschoolers, the experiment was carried out in the form of a game: the experimenter conditionally designated on the table the space for the kitchen, children's room, garden and yard. The children were asked to place the cards on the bridges on the table to which, in their opinion, they were most suitable. They had to put cards that did not fit in these places next to them as “extra”. It was meant that the children would put a primus stove, a kettle, and a saucepan in the “kitchen”; to the “children’s room” - a drum, a ball, a teddy bear, etc.

In this experiment, students and adults were given a cognitive task: to sort the cards into groups according to the content of the objects depicted on them, and put the “extra” ones aside separately.

After laying out the cards, they were removed, and the subjects were asked to remember the objects and numbers depicted on them. Preschoolers reproduced only the names of objects.

Thus, in this experiment, the subjects carried out cognitive activity or play activity cognitive nature, and not the activity of memorization. In both cases, they acted with the objects depicted on the cards: they perceived, comprehended their content, and sorted them into groups. The numbers on the cards in this experiment were not part of the content of the task, so the subjects did not need to show any special activity in relation to them. However, throughout the entire experiment, the numbers were in the field of perception of the subjects; they acted on their senses.

According to our assumptions, in this experiment the objects were to be remembered, but the numbers were not.

In the second experiment, other subjects were given the same 15 cards as in the first experiment. In addition, they were given a cardboard board on which 15 white squares were glued, the size of cards; 12 squares formed a square frame on the shield, and 3 were arranged in a column (see Fig. 1).

Before the experiment began, cards were laid out on the table in such a way that the numbers pasted on them did not create a certain order in their arrangement. While the experimental instructions were being presented to the subject, the cards were covered. The subject was given the task: placing cards in a certain order on each white square, laying them out into a frame and a column on the board. The cards must be placed so that the numbers pasted on them are arranged in ascending order. The result of correctly completing the task is presented in Figure 1.

Drawing up an increasing number series, a given order of laying out frames and columns of cards forced the subject to look for cards with certain numbers, comprehend the numbers, and relate them to each other.

In order to ensure serious attitude subjects to the task, they were told that this experiment would test their ability to work carefully. Subjects were warned that errors in the arrangement of numbers would be recorded and would serve as an indicator of their degree of attentiveness. For the same purpose, the subject was asked to check the correctness of his performance of the task: add up the last 3 numbers arranged in a column in his mind and compare their sum with the sum of these three numbers named by the experimenter before the experiment.

For the preschool children tested, the following changes were made to the methodology of this experiment. Instead of a number, each card had a special icon stuck on it. Fifteen icons were made up of a combination of three shapes (cross, circle, stick) and five various colors(red, blue, black, green and yellow). The same icons were pasted on each square of the frame and column. The cards were placed in front of the subject so that the arrangement of the icons did not create the order in which these icons were located on the squares of the frame and column. The subject had to place on each square of the frame and column the card that had the same icon as the one on the square. Laying out the frames and columns with cards was carried out in the same order as in the first version of the technique, therefore, here, too, the subject had to search for a specific card for each square with the corresponding icon. After completing the task, the subject was asked to name the objects depicted on the cards.

Picture 1

Thus, in the second experiment, the subjects carried out cognitive rather than mnemonic activity. However, pictures and numbers played here as if in directly opposite roles. In the first experiment, the subject of the subjects' activity were pictures, and numbers were the object of only passive perception. In the second experiment, on the contrary: the task of sorting numbers into increasing magnitudes made them the subject of activity, and the pictures only an object of passive perception. Therefore, we had the right to expect directly opposite results: in the first experiment, pictures were to be remembered, and in the second, numbers.

This technique was also adapted for conducting a group experiment...

Individual experiments, involving 354 subjects, were carried out with middle and older preschoolers, with junior and middle schoolchildren and adults.

Group experiments were carried out with students of grades II, III, IV, V, VI and VII and with students; 1212 subjects participated in them.

In both individual and group experiments we dealt with involuntary memory. The content of the tasks in the first and second experiments was cognitive and not mnemonic in nature. In order to give the subjects the impression that our experiments were not related to memory, and to prevent them from developing a memorization mindset, we presented the first experiment as a thinking experiment aimed at testing classification skills, and the second as an experiment testing attention.

Proof that we were able to achieve this goal was the fact that in both experiments the experimenter's proposal to reproduce pictures and numbers was perceived by the subjects as completely unexpected for them. This applied to the objects of their activity, and especially to the objects of their passive perception (numbers in the first experiment and images of objects in the second).

The arithmetic mean for each group of subjects was taken as the memory indicators. The reliability of our indicators is confirmed by the extremely collected nature of the statistical series for each experiment and each group of subjects, as well as the fundamental coincidence of the indicators of the individual experiment with the group indicators obtained on a large number of subjects.

In both individual and group experiments, we obtained sharp differences in memorizing pictures and numbers in the first and second experiments, and in all groups of our subjects. For example, in the first experiment in adults (individual experiment), the rate of memorization of pictures was 19 times greater than that of numbers (13.2 and 0.7), and in the second experiment numbers were remembered 8 times more than pictures (10.2 and 1 ,3).

These differences according to individual experiments are presented in Figure 2.

How can we explain the differences obtained in memorizing pictures and numbers?

Figure 2. Comparative memory curves (first and second experiments)

The main difference in the conditions of our experiments was that in the first experiment the subject of activity was pictures, and in the second - numbers. This determined the high productivity of their memorization, although the subject of activity in these experiments and the activity itself were different. The absence of purposeful activity in relation to these same objects, where they acted in experiments only as background stimuli, led to a sharp decrease in their memorization.

This difference caused a sharp discrepancy in memorization results. This means that the reason for the high productivity of memorizing pictures in the first experiment and numbers in the second is the activity of our subjects in relation to them.

The fact that the explanation of the obtained results by reference to attention is at least insufficient is clearly proven by the factual materials of our special experiments.

Before the experiment began, 15 pictures were laid out on the table. Then the subject was sequentially presented with another 15 pictures. The subject had to place each of the presented pictures on one of the pictures on the table, so that the name of both began with the same letter. For example: hammer - ball, desk - locomotive, etc. Thus, the subject made 15 pairs of pictures.

The second experiment was carried out in the same way as the first, but pairs of pictures were not formed according to external sign, but in terms of meaning. For example: lock - key, watermelon - knife, etc.

In both experiments we were dealing with involuntary memorization, since the subject was not given the task of remembering, and the offer to remember the pictures was unexpected for them.

So, activity with objects is the main reason for involuntary memorization of them. This position is confirmed not only by the fact of high productivity in memorizing pictures and numbers where they were the subject of the subjects’ activity, but also by their poor memorization where they were only background stimuli. The latter indicates that memorization cannot be reduced to direct imprinting i.e., to the result of the unilateral influence of objects on the senses outside of human activity aimed at these objects...

At the same time, we did not obtain complete, absolute non-memorization of numbers in the first experiment and pictures in the second, although these objects in these experiments were not the subject of the subjects’ activity, but acted as background stimuli.

Doesn't this contradict the position we put forward that memorization is a product of activity, and not the result of direct imprinting?

Observations of the process of the subjects performing the task, conversations with them about how they managed to remember pictures in the second experiment and numbers in the first, lead us to the conclusion that memorization in these cases was always associated with one or another distraction from completing the task and thus with the subject displaying a certain action towards them. Often this was not realized by the subjects themselves. Most often, this kind of distraction was associated with the beginning of the experiment, when the pictures were opened in front of the subject, and he had not yet entered into the situation of performing the task; They were also caused by rearranging pictures in case of mistakes and other reasons that could not always be taken into account.

Connected with these circumstances is a very stable fact that we obtained in these experiments, which seems, at first glance, paradoxical. Where pictures and numbers were the subject of activity, a clear tendency of a gradual increase in the indicators of their memorization with the age of the subjects was quite naturally expressed. Indicators of memorization of background stimuli express the exact opposite trend: they do not increase with age, but decrease. The highest rates of picture memorization were obtained from preschoolers (3.1), the lowest - from adults (1.3); younger schoolchildren remembered 1.5 numbers, and adults - 0.7. In absolute numbers, these differences are small, but the general trend is expressed quite convincingly.

This fact is explained by the peculiarities of the activity of younger subjects when performing tasks. Observations showed that younger schoolchildren and especially preschoolers entered the experimental situation more slowly; more often than middle schoolchildren and especially adults, they were distracted by other stimuli. Therefore, numbers in the first experiment and pictures in the second attracted their attention and became the subject of some kind of side effects.

Thus, individual facts of memorization of background stimuli not only do not contradict, but confirm our position that involuntary memorization is a product of activity, and not the result of direct imprinting of inactive objects.

It seems to us that the position about the irreducibility of memorization to direct imprinting, its dependence and conditioning by human activity is important not only for understanding memory processes. It also has a more general, fundamentally theoretical significance for understanding the essence of the psyche and consciousness.

The facts obtained in our experiments and the position that follows from them are not consistent with any kind of epiphenomenalistic concepts of consciousness. Any mental formation - sensation, idea, etc. - is not the result of a passive, mirror reflection, objects and their properties, but the result of reflection included in the active, active attitude subject to these objects and their properties. The subject reflects reality and appropriates any reflection of reality as a subject of action, and not a subject of passive contemplation.

The obtained facts reveal the complete inconsistency of the old associative psychology with its mechanical and idealistic understanding of the process of formation of associations. In both cases, memorization was interpreted as immediate imprinting at the same time. Inactive objects, without taking into account the actual work of the brain, which implements certain human activities in relation to these objects...

In the experiments described, we obtained facts characterizing two forms of involuntary memorization. The first of them is a product of purposeful activity. This includes the facts of memorizing pictures in the process of their classification (first experiment) and numbers when the subjects compiled a number series (second experiment). The second form is the product of various orienting reactions evoked by the same objects as background stimuli. These reactions are not directly related to the subject of purposeful activity. This includes isolated facts of memorizing pictures in the second experiment and numbers in the first, where they acted as background stimuli.

The latter form of involuntary memorization has been the subject of many studies in foreign psychology. This kind of memorization is called “random” memorization. In reality, such memorization is not accidental in nature, as foreign psychologists point out, especially in recent studies.

The big mistake of many foreign psychologists was that they tried to exhaust all involuntary memorization by such random memorization. In this regard, it received a predominantly negative description. Meanwhile, such random memorization constitutes only one, and minor, form of involuntary memorization.

Purposeful activity occupies a fundamental place in the life of not only humans, but also animals. Therefore, involuntary memorization, which is a product of such activity, is its main, most vital form.

In this regard, the study of its laws is of particularly great theoretical and practical interest.

Published by: Zinchenko P.I. Involuntary memorization/ Edited by V.P. Zinchenko and B.G. Meshcheryakova. M.: Publishing house "Institute practical psychology", Voronezh: NPO "MODEK", 1996. 158–175.

Chapter III. Involuntary memory and activity

In foreign psychology, as we have already noted, involuntary memorization was understood as the random imprinting of objects that, in the words of Myers Shallow, were within the scope of attention when it was directed to some other objects. This understanding determined the methodological principle of most studies, which consisted in isolating certain objects as much as possible from the activities of the subjects caused by the instructions, leaving these objects only in the field of perception, that is, only as background stimuli.

We assumed that the main form of involuntary memorization is a product of purposeful activity. Other forms of this type of memorization are the results of other forms of activity of the subject.

For this purpose, the following research methodology was developed.

In addition to the image, each card had a number written in black ink in its upper right corner; the numbers indicated the following numbers: 1, 7, 10, 11, 16, 19, 23, 28, 34, 35, 39, 40, 42, 47, 50.

The following 2 experiments were carried out with the described material.

In the first experiment, the subjects acted with objects depicted on the cards. This action was organized differently in the experiment with the subjects of different ages. With preschoolers, the experiment was carried out in the form of a game: the experimenter conditionally designated on the table the space for the kitchen, children's room, garden and yard. The children were asked to place the cards in places on the table to which, in their opinion, they were most suitable. They had to put the cards that did not fit in these places next to them as “extra cards.” It was meant that the children would put a primus stove, a kettle, and a saucepan in the “kitchen”; to the “children’s room” - a drum, a ball, a teddy bear, etc.

After laying out the cards, they were removed, and the subjects were asked to remember the objects and numbers depicted on them. Preschoolers reproduced only the names of objects.

Thus, in this experiment, the subjects carried out cognitive activity or play activity of a cognitive nature, and not memorization activity. In both cases, they acted with the objects depicted on the cards: they perceived, comprehended their content, and sorted them into groups. The numbers on the cards in this experiment were not part of the content of the task, so the subjects did not need to show any special activity in relation to them. However, throughout the entire experiment, the numbers were in the field of perception of the subjects; they acted on their senses.

According to our assumptions, in this experiment the objects were to be remembered, but the numbers were not.

Rice. 2. Layout of the number series (second experiment)

Before the experiment began, cards were laid out on the table in such a way that the numbers pasted on them did not create a certain order in their arrangement. While the experimental instructions were being presented to the subject, the cards were covered. The subject was given the task: placing cards in a certain order on each white square, laying them out into a frame and a column on the board. The cards must be placed so that the numbers pasted on them are arranged in ascending order. Result correct execution The problem is presented in Fig. 2.

The compilation of an increasing number series, a given order of laying out frames and columns of cards forced the subject to look for cards with certain numbers, comprehend the numbers, and relate them to each other.

To ensure that subjects took the task seriously, they were told that the experience would test their ability to pay attention. Subjects were warned that errors in the arrangement of numbers would be recorded and would serve as an indicator of their degree of attentiveness. For the same purpose, the subject is asked to check the correctness of his performance of the task: add in his mind the last 3 numbers arranged in a column and compare their sum with the sum of these three numbers named by the experimenter before the experiment.

For the preschool children tested, the following changes were made to the methodology of this experiment. Instead of a number, each card had a special icon stuck on it. The fifteen icons were made up of a combination of three shapes (cross, circle, stick) and five different colors (red, blue, black, green and yellow). The same icons were pasted on each square of the frame and column. The cards were placed in front of the subject so that the arrangement of the icons did not create the order in which these icons were located on the squares of the frame and column. The subject had to place on each square of the frame and column the card that had the same icon as the one on the square. Laying out the frames and columns with cards was carried out in the same order as in the first version of the technique, therefore, here, too, the subject had to search for a specific card for each square with the corresponding icon. After completing the task, the subject was asked to name the objects depicted on the cards.

Thus, in the second experiment, the subjects carried out cognitive rather than mnemonic activity. However, pictures and numbers played here as if in directly opposite roles. In the first experiment, the subject of the subjects' activity were pictures, and numbers were the object of only passive perception. In the second experiment, it was the other way around: the task of sorting numbers into increasing magnitudes made them the subject of activity, and the pictures only an object of passive perception. Therefore, we had the right to expect exactly the opposite results: in the first experiment, pictures should have been remembered, and in the second, numbers.

This technique was also adapted for conducting a group experiment. At the same time, we tried, firstly, to preserve the main purpose and main features of the methodology of each experiment in the form in which they were carried out in an individual experiment; secondly, just as in an individual experiment, create equal conditions in terms of exposure time and repetition opportunities. The materials for the group experiment were the same cards and numbers.

For this purpose, the following changes were made to the methodology. In the first experiment, instead of marking on the table spatial points for the kitchen, garden, children's room, yard and “extra”, the subjects wrote down these groups on their sheets. In the individual experiment, the placement of pictures on cards in designated places was replaced by the subjects’ mental assignment of pictures to one group or another. The subjects recorded this assignment in the following way: showing the picture, the experimenter named an ordinal number, and the subjects wrote down these ordinal numbers in the group where, in their opinion, the picture fit best. For example, if the card with the picture “kettle” was presented fifth, then the subjects put the number 5 next to the written word “kitchen,” etc. Before presenting each card individually, subjects were shown all the pictures at once for half a minute. The purpose of this display was the same as in the individual experiment: preliminary assignment by the subjects of the pictures to the corresponding groups.

In the second experiment, the subjects were asked to draw on their pieces of paper the same frame and column as in Fig. 2. The pictures, displayed in front of a group of subjects on a special board, were closed during the presentation of instructions and were opened only when the subjects began to complete the task. In the cells of the frame and column, the subjects were asked to put down numbers that were pasted on cards. These numbers had to be written in ascending order in the cells of the frame and column, and the cells were filled with numbers in the same order in which the pictures were superimposed on the squares of the frame and column in an individual experiment. The arrangement of the cards on the board, as in the individual experiment, excluded increasing order in the arrangement of numbers. This created the same need to search for the necessary numbers. In order to keep the subjects who finished earlier than others busy with work, and thereby distract them from looking at the pictures until the experiment was stopped, an additional task was given: draw another frame and column and fill the cells with letters in the alphabet in the same order as the numbers were filled in.

We believe that the basis for comparing data from individual and group experiments has been preserved not only with respect to the nature of the tasks posed in each experiment, but also with respect to the conditions for their implementation. We did not obtain a complete coincidence of memorization indicators in individual and group experiments, but their general tendency, as we will see later, emerged in a clear and convincing form.

Individual experiments, involving 354 subjects, were carried out with middle and older preschoolers, with junior and middle schoolchildren and adults.

Group experiments were carried out with students of grades II, III, IV, V, VI, VII and students; 1212 subjects participated in them.

Proof that we were able to achieve this goal was the fact that in both experiments the experimenter’s proposal to reproduce pictures and numbers was perceived by the subjects as completely unexpected for them. This applied to the objects of their activity, and especially to the objects of their passive perception (numbers in the first experiment and images of objects in the second).

The arithmetic mean for each group of subjects was taken as the memory indicators. We are convinced of the reliability of our indicators by the extremely collected nature of the statistical series for each experiment and each group of subjects, as well as the fundamental coincidence of the indicators of the individual experiment with the group indicators obtained on a large number of subjects.

The general results of the experiments are presented: for an individual experiment - in table. 1, by group - in table. 2.

^ Table 1

Results of memorization in individual experiments

(in arithmetic average)

Memorization

Subjects

Avg. doshk.

Avg. schools

Adults

1 . Classification of objects

2. Drawing up a number series

Items Numbers

Numbers Items

table 2

^Memorization results in group experiments

(in arithmetic average)

Memory objects

Subjects

Class students

Adults

1. Classification of objects

2. Drawing up a number series

Items Numbers

Items

These differences according to individual experiments are presented in Fig. 3.

How can we explain the differences obtained in memorizing pictures and numbers?

The main difference in the conditions of our experiments was that in the first experiment the subject of activity was pictures, and in the second - numbers. This led to the high productivity of their memorization, although the subject

Rice. 3. Comparative memory curves (first and second experiments)

The activities in these experiments and the activity itself were different. The absence of purposeful activity in relation to these same objects, where they acted in experiments only as background stimuli, led to sharp decline memorizing them.

Another explanation suggests itself, which seems, at first glance, to be the simplest and most obvious. We can say that the differences in memorization are explained by the fact that in one case the subjects paid attention to pictures and numbers, but in the other they did not. Our subjects, being busy following instructions, indeed, as a rule, did not pay attention to numbers in the first experiment, and to pictures in the second. Therefore, they especially sharply protested against our demand to remember these objects: “I was dealing with pictures, but didn’t pay attention to numbers,” “I didn’t pay any attention to pictures at all, but was busy with numbers”—these were the usual answers of the subjects. In group experiments, these protests were expressed in chorus and therefore were especially accepted harsh character. The subjects were greeted with surprise by the invitation to remember pictures in the first experiment and numbers in the second. However, this surprise quickly disappeared as soon as they, unexpectedly for themselves, discovered the possibility of reproduction.

There is no doubt that the presence or absence of attention of the subjects in our experiments had an impact on the resulting differences in memorization. However, attention alone cannot explain the facts we obtained. Despite the fact that the nature of attention still continues to be discussed in psychology,1 one thing is certain: its function and impact on the productivity of human activity cannot be considered in isolation from the activity itself. Failure to comply with this condition explains the fruitless attempts to understand the essence of attention. In idealistic psychology, it acted as a special spiritual force that organized the course of mental processes; in mechanistic psychology it was reduced to the influence varying degrees the intensity of the impact of the objects themselves. But in both cases, attention was considered outside of mental activity, as external factor in relation to her. Meanwhile, attention itself must receive its explanation from the content of the activity, from the role it plays in it, and not as its explanatory principle.

The fact that the explanation of the obtained results by reference to attention is at least insufficient is clearly proven by the factual materials of our special experiments.

The second experiment was carried out in the same way as the first, but pairs of pictures were formed not according to external characteristics, but according to semantic ones. For example: lock - key, watermelon - knife, etc.

In both experiments we were dealing with involuntary memorization, since the subject was not given the task of remembering, and the offer to remember the pictures was unexpected for them.

The memorization results in the first experiment turned out to be extremely insignificant, several times less than in the second. In these experiments, reference to lack of attention to the pictures is virtually impossible. The subject not only saw the pictures, but, as required by the instructions, pronounced their names out loud in order to highlight the initial letter of the corresponding word. Therefore, in both compared experiments, the subjects had to direct their attention to the selected pictures. And if attention could explain everything, we would have the right to expect identical memorization results in these two experiments. However, what is important is what the subjects’ activity was aimed at: in the first experiment it was aimed at highlighting initial letter words, and in the second - on the content of the word itself. This means that it is not attention itself that is important, but what the subjects did with the object. It is clear that activity can proceed with more or less attention, and thus attention will influence the results of activity. But elucidating this influence should be the subject of special research.

So, activity with objects is the main reason for involuntary memorization of them. This position is confirmed not only by the fact of high productivity in memorizing pictures and numbers where they were the subject of the subjects’ activity, but also by their poor memorization where they were only background stimuli. The latter indicates that memorization cannot be reduced to direct imprinting, that is, to the result of the unilateral influence of objects on the senses outside of human activity aimed at these objects.

Meanwhile, for such direct imprinting, the pictures and numbers in our experiments were under relatively identical conditions. First, the exposure times for pictures and numbers within each experiment were the same. Secondly, the numbers were quite striking due to their size and brightness of color. But even if we do not agree with this and assume that for direct imprinting numbers were in worse conditions than pictures, then this assumption comes into clear contradiction with the facts obtained in the second experiment, where pictures were remembered as poorly as numbers compared to numbers. and numbers in the first experiment. Moreover, the time for exposing the pictures in the second experiment was even longer than in the first, since laying out the frame and column usually took more time than classifying the pictures, so there were greater opportunities for examining them again.

The presence or absence of activities with pictures and numbers caused much greater differences in their memory than the objective features of these items. This is evidenced by the data in Table. 3.

Table 3

Comparative effectiveness of involuntary memorization of pictures and numbers acting as the subject of activity and as background stimuli

Comparable objects

Individual experiences

Group experiments

IN different situations experiments

Jr. pupils

Avg. pupils

Adults

Jr. pupils

Avg. pupils

Adults

1. Difference in memorizing pictures in the first and second experiments

2. Difference in remembering numbers in the second and first experiments

3. The difference in memorizing pictures in the first experiment and numbers in the second

4. The difference in memorizing pictures in the second experiment and numbers in the first

As we can see, the difference in memorizing both pictures and numbers, when in one case they were the subject of activity, and in the other - only background stimuli (the first 2 rows), turns out to be several times greater than the difference in memorizing these objects caused by their features ( last 2 rows).

Pictures were remembered somewhat better than numbers both as an object of activity and as background stimuli.

This suggests that the objects themselves are not indifferent to the results of memorization. However, they acquire their meaning not in themselves, but in connection with what activity they can cause and what activity was actually carried out with them. Apparently, the classification of pictures contributed to their memorization to a greater extent than the classification of numbers when compiling a number series from them. The fact that here too the activity turns out to be decisive condition, says the next one interesting fact: the difference in memorizing pictures compared to memorizing numbers turns out to be significantly greater in conditions when they were the subject of activity (third row) than when they acted as background stimuli (fourth row). In this latter role, their ability to memorize was almost equal. However, the fact that pictures were remembered somewhat better in the position of background stimuli than numbers suggests that the possibilities of causing orientation and attracting attention were greater for pictures than for numbers. Therefore, the characteristics of the objects themselves are also important when they act as background stimuli.

Doesn't this contradict the position we put forward that memorization is a product of activity, and not the result of direct imprinting?

Let's look at this in more detail.

First of all, we are convinced of the correctness of our statement by relatively a large number of subjects who did not remember a single number in the first experiment and not a single picture in the second. These data are presented in table. 4.

As you can see, the number of subjects who did not remember a single picture or a single number is quite large: it is 400 people, or 26.0% of the number of all subjects (1566 people). Our position is even more convincingly confirmed by the analysis of individual cases of non-memorization.

^ Table 4

The number of subjects who did not remember a single picture (second experiment) and not a single number (first experiment), according to data from individual and group experiments

Subjects

Images

Pictures and numbers

Absolute numbers

In absolute numbers

Senior preschoolers Junior schoolchildren

Middle school students Adults

Usually, the rapid inclusion of a task in a situation, intense, tense, and undistracted work to complete it was associated with failure to remember objects that were not the subject of the subject’s activity. Moreover, in such cases they were literally not noticed by the subjects.

We conducted experiments on recognizing these pictures with several subjects who did not remember a single picture in the second series. As a rule, we received no recognition. The subjects treated the pictures (which they actually saw several times, held them in their hands, but did not act on) as if they were seeing them for the first time.

Subject T.G., scientist, was extremely conscientious about completing the task of the second experiment. He perceived this task as an experience for attention. The experimenter warned the subject several times that all his attention should be focused on ensuring that when laying out the frame with cards the ascending order of numbers was not violated, that any violation of this condition would be taken into account and characterize the degree of his attention. In this experiment, the subject remembered 10 numbers and did not remember a single picture.

After this, the experimenter told the subject that he would now give him other cards and use these cards to conduct another experiment on thinking with him. However, he was given the same cards and the first experiment was carried out. The subject remembered 15 pictures and not a single number.

As it turned out from a further conversation with the subject, he did not notice that in two experiments carried out with him immediately after the other, the cards were the same? pictures and numbers.

In the first experiment, there were also cases when, when asked by the experimenter to remember what numbers were on the cards, the subject not only could not name a single number, but was surprised to learn from the experimenter that there were numbers on the cards.

These facts give reason to believe that the slight memorization of background stimuli, which did occur (see Fig. 3, p. 165), is also determined not simply by the fact of their impact on the sense organs, but by the actions of the subjects with them (the appearance of such actions could not be completely prevented by the instructions and organization of our experiments).

Observations of the process of the subjects performing the task, conversations with them about how they managed to remember pictures in the second experiment and numbers in the first, lead us to the conclusion that memorization in these cases was always associated with one or another distraction from completing the task and thus with the subject displaying a certain action towards them. Often this was not realized by the subjects themselves. Most often, this kind of distraction was associated with the beginning of the experiment itself, when the pictures were opened in front of the subject, and he had not yet entered into the situation of performing the task; They were also caused by rearranging pictures in case of mistakes and other reasons that could not always be taken into account.

This fact is explained by the peculiarities of the activity of younger subjects when performing tasks. Observations showed that younger schoolchildren and especially schoolchildren entered the experimental situation more slowly; more often than middle schoolchildren and especially adults, they were distracted by other stimuli. Therefore, the numbers in the first experiment and the pictures in the second attracted their attention and became the subject of some side effects. This explains the fact that preschoolers gave the smallest percentage of those who did not remember a single picture in the second experiment, and primary schoolchildren showed a smaller percentage of those who did not remember pictures and numbers compared to middle schoolchildren and adults (see Table 4, p. 170).

It seems to us that the position about the irreducibility of memorization to direct imprinting, its dependence and conditionality by human activity has important not only for understanding memory processes. It also has a more general, fundamentally theoretical significance for understanding the essence of the psyche and consciousness.

The facts obtained in our experiments and the position that follows from them are not consistent with any kind of epiphenomenalistic concepts of consciousness. Any mental formation - sensation, idea, etc. - is not the result of a passive, mirror reflection of objects and their properties, but the result of a reflection included in the effective, active attitude of the subject to these objects and their properties. The subject reflects reality and appropriates any reflection of reality as a subject of action, and not a subject of passive contemplation.

The obtained facts reveal the complete inconsistency of the old associative psychology with its mechanistic and idealistic understanding of the process of formation of associations. In both cases, memorization was interpreted as the direct imprinting of simultaneously affecting objects, without taking into account the actual work of the brain, which implements certain human activities in relation to these objects.

In the first part of the work, we dwelled in detail on the characteristics of the fundamental difference in the interpretation of memory processes from the standpoint of the reflex theory of the psyche. We pointed out there the fundamental differences between the old understanding of the essence of associations and its new understanding in the light of the doctrine of conditioned reflexes. In this sense, it is important for us now to pay attention to the need for orientation to stimuli.

The indicative reaction can be as simple and short-term as desired, but it always precedes the formation of a neural connection. Every interaction of the subject with the environment, from the simplest to the most complex, begins with an indicative reaction.

It is also important that one indicative reaction to stimuli may be sufficient for the formation of a reflex even in animals. We pointed out this when analyzing the experiments of Podkopaev and Narbutovich et al. with animals. Moreover, the possibilities for developing neural connections based on indicative reinforcement in people are endless.

Our facts indicate the need for a person to interact with an object in order to capture it, remember it, and that for this purpose only the impact of the object on the senses is insufficient. There is no need to say that this interaction with the object occurred in those cases when our subjects, according to the instructions, performed the task of classifying objects depicted on cards in the first experiment or compiled a number series in the second. There this interaction took place in the form of a purposeful cognitive activity. But interaction with pictures and numbers was sometimes in those words

Memorization without mnemonic orientation, without the intention to remember, is called involuntary. It ensures the preservation of most of our experience, but it began to be studied later than arbitrary and for a long time was considered inaccurate, fragile, capturing “random” facts that were not included in the field of attention. Indeed, there is a lot of data that, at first glance, confirms this opinion. For example, when a fight was staged, only 47% of correct answers were received from the children who watched it. Or a man who repeated a prayer every day after his wife and said it about 5000 times, could not recite it by heart when he was asked to do so, but learned the text of the prayer after that in several repetitions. The incompleteness, inaccuracy and inconsistency of witness testimony are also well known, which was first described and analyzed by V. Stern at the beginning of the 20th century. However, later studies by P.I. Zinchenko and A.A. Smirnov showed that the problem of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of involuntary memorization is much more complicated.

Smirnov, unexpectedly for the subjects, asked them to remember everything that they remembered on the way from home to work, or (in the second series of experiments) asked them to tell what happened during a scientific meeting at which they were present a week before the experiments. It was concluded that involuntary memorization depends on the main line of activity during which it was carried out, and on the motives that determine this activity. Subjects most often recalled what they did (rather than what they thought), what contributed or hindered the achievement of the goal, as well as something strange or unusual. Those provisions from the speeches that were closely related to the range of knowledge and interests of the subjects were also remembered. When studying involuntary memorization, Zinchenko asked subjects to perform tasks that required different intellectual activity. He found that the effectiveness of memorization depends on whether what is memorized is the goal of the activity or just a means of its implementation. Another factor is the degree, the level of intellectual activity. High intellectual activity is necessary in order to compensate for the lack of mnemonic orientation. That is why, for example, numbers from problems that the subject himself came up with were involuntarily remembered better, and not those that were in problems proposed for solution in ready-made form.

Comparative studies of the effectiveness of voluntary and involuntary memorization have shown that with deep penetration into the semantic content of the material, with mental processing of what is perceived, even without a mnemonic task, the material is retained in memory more firmly than what was memorized voluntarily, but without active intellectual activity. At the same time, where involuntary memorization is more productive than voluntary, this advantage in children weakens with age, since a higher mental development causes less intellectual activity when performing the proposed tasks.

Involuntary memorization depends on the relationship of activity to intentions and needs. B.V. effect Zeigarnik lies in the fact that subjects who are offered a series of tasks, when unexpectedly asked to remember these tasks, name more interrupted, unfinished activities. The effect is explained by the lack of tension release, which is created by the “quasi-need” to perform the activity. It depends, however, on many factors, and, in particular, with high motivation, when motives associated with protecting the self come to the fore, the dependence is reversed: memories of “unpleasant” tasks and failures are suppressed.

A difficult question is the influence of emotions on the effectiveness of involuntary memorization. According to Freud, what has a strong negative connotation is repressed into the unconscious. Other authors (for example, Blonsky) obtained different data in experiments, noting that forgetting unpleasant things is unlikely to be useful for life. What is clear is that usually emotional coloring improves memorization compared to memorization of emotionally neutral material. S.L. Rubinstein considers it impossible to give an unambiguous answer to the question of whether pleasant or unpleasant things are remembered better. Unfortunately, the mechanisms of the influence of emotions on memorization are still poorly understood.

In modern cognitive psychology, the “level of processing” model proposed by F. Craik and R. Lockhart is most directly related to the issue under discussion. According to this model, memory is a by-product of information processing, and the retention of its traces directly depends on the depth of processing. Superficial, sensory analysis is less effective for memorization than, for example, semantic analysis. This model, which is essentially similar to the earlier views of Smirnov and Zinchenko, has been criticized, but it explains many facts well (for example, an actor remembering the text of a role while working on it or an investigator remembering those difficult cases that he led). It has also been shown that students prone to deep processing educational material, they remember it better (R. Schmeck). “Personal development” of material is also useful, for example, searching for events from personal experience, corresponding to the studied patterns, or attempts to use these patterns in practice.

P.I. Zinchenko studied the patterns of involuntary memorization, studying its features in comparison with voluntary memorization. The experiments made it possible to obtain data on the dependence of memorization productivity on age, the proposed stimulus material, the motive of activity and the structure of activity, specifically on the type of tasks, level of complexity, and methods of activity.

In addition, it examines problems of voluntary memorization, mental operations such as classification and arithmetic calculations.

Involuntary memorization can be both a product of current activity and the result of distractions from it, that is, accidental memorization. The division of memory processes into voluntary and involuntary should act as a leader in the characteristics of memory development. Involuntary and voluntary memorization and reproduction are two successive stages in the development of children's memory.

Voluntary memorization as a special mnemonic action becomes possible when spiral goals to remember and remember are highlighted in the child’s mind. The identification and development of mnemonic goals depends not only on the objective conditions that require the child to set such goals, but also on the corresponding motivation that gives the necessary meaning to these goals and, thereby, contributes to their awareness.

With the advent of voluntary memory, involuntary memorization does not lose its significance. It continues to change and become increasingly enriched as a result of further development of the content of the activity in which it is carried out.

In cases where involuntary memorization of certain material is the result of meaningful active mental activity. It turns out to be more productive than arbitrary, which is not based on the same meaningful processing of the material. Arbitrary memory characterized by logical processing of material for the purpose of memorization.

There are three main stages in the formation of classification as a cognitive action:

1) First stage mastering cognitive action;

2) the stage of improvement in mastering cognitive action;

3) the stage of complete mastery of cognitive action.

Middle preschoolers are at the first stage of forming classification as a cognitive action. Under these conditions, the advantage of involuntary memorization over voluntary one turns out to be especially significant.

Older preschoolers are at the second stage of formation of cognitive action. The advantage of involuntary memorization over voluntary remains significant.

U junior schoolchildren third stage of cognitive action. A slight advantage of involuntary memorization over voluntary memory remains.

In middle school students and adults, a turning point occurs in the ratio of memorization productivity: voluntary memorization becomes more productive.

The process of formation of cognitive and mnemonic actions goes the following way: from a purposeful, comprehensive and not yet generalized action to an abbreviated, generalized action.

The data obtained made it possible to substantiate and prove P.I. Zinchenko considers the legitimacy of dividing memory into voluntary and involuntary, since he considers the division of memory into logical and mechanical to be insufficiently legitimate, since both types are present throughout development.

P.I. Zinchenko showed:

The general (uniform) nature of voluntary and involuntary memorization, as evidenced by the general subject content activities (goal, motive, methods);

The importance of taking into account living conditions and activities;

Rote as a special form of memorization, and not a stage of memory development;

Mastering the corresponding cognitive action (as a method of mnemonic action) allows voluntary memorization to become more productive than involuntary memorization;

Involuntary memorization develops in the same way as voluntary memory. The basis of development is action: involuntary memorization is a cognitive action, and voluntary memorization is a mnemonic action.

Regarding the processes of memorization in low-performing students, the following characteristics can be distinguished:

1. difficulties organizing your attention

2. difficulties in comprehending and understanding the material

3. difficulty in random orientation (the student does not show interest or curiosity)

4. difficulties in setting a cognitive task (predominance of rote learning)

To work with low-performing students (due to difficulties in memorizing material), the following techniques are suggested:

Give preference primarily to the “holistic” over the “elemental”;

Combine cognitive tasks with performing an opinion task, but do not replace them with each other

Focusing on how the teacher conveys the main goal of the activity (content) and conditions:

Setting a learning task;

Using active means (example, homework);

Addressing two types of memorization;

Provoke questions from students problematic situations, cognitive tasks, presentation of material;

Accounting is important age characteristics, memory development.

The abstract was completed by 5th year students Tatyana Druzhinina, Zoya Gubanova, Olesya Korotkina, Mamonova Taisiya.

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